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Benoit Dostie, John Cockburn and Bernard Decaluwé 
October 1996 
Abstract 
Trade policy analysis has experienced major changes over the last 
decade on both the theoretical and empirical fronts. The "new" trade 
theory points out that the presence of imperfect competition in a mar- 
ket renders theoretically ambiguous the magnitude and the direction of 
trade policy effects, particularly on resource allocation, factor payments 
and welfare. On the empirical front, the computable general equilibrium 
model (CGEM) has emerged as a leading tool for empirical analysis of 
trade policy. In this paper, we explore the convergence of these two devel- 
opments - CGEMs with imperfect competition - and their applicability to 
developing countries. For these countries, the principal application of this 
theory is in the study of the impact of trade policy when domestic mar- 
kets behave in a non-competitive way. In particular, taking into account 
the market power of local firms on the domestic market can modify the 
magnitude and the direction of welfare changes and resource reallocations 
to be expected from trade liberalization. A survey of CGEMs with imper- 
fect competition shows that these impacts depend on the way imperfect 
competition is modelled. In a final section, we illustrate the ambiguous 
effects of trade policy with a series of simple CGEMs with and without 
imperfect competition and scale economies. 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the December 1995 meeting of the 
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and at the May 1996 meetings of the Société 
canadienne de sciences économiques (SCSE). This research was conducted under the auspices 
of the Programme d'analyses et de recherches économiques appliquées au développement in- 
ternational (PARADI), which is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) as a Centre of Excellence. The institutions affiliated with PARADI are the Centre 
de recherche et développement en économique (C.R.D.E.)of the Université de Montréal and 
the Centre de recherche en économie et finance appliquées (CREFA) of Université Laval. We 
would also like to thanks Shanta Devarajan, Jaime de Melo and Tobias Muller for helpful 
comments. The usual caveat apply. 
Centre de recherche en économie et finance appliquees (CREFA), Université Laval, 
jcoc@ecn.ulaval.ca or bdec©ecn.ulaval.ca 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, economic analysis of trade policies has undergone a significant 
transformation as the presence of imperfect competition has been taken into 
account. Though first applied to industrialized nations, we shall see that in- 
troducing imperfect competition is at least as pertinent, if not more so, in the 
case of developing countries. We know that the presence of imperfect compe- 
tition has serious economic consequences which must be taken into account in 
the analysis of trade policy: sub-optimal levels of production and consumption, 
higher prices, 'sur or super-profits', etc. 
Under these conditions, trade policy may have some unexpected effects. As 
we will explore later, by creating a more competitive environment, trade liber- 
alization may paradoxically lead to an expansion of previously highly protected 
sectors (generally manufacturing) and a contraction in activities (generally agri- 
culture) which were relatively unprotected. 
To accurately capture the complex effects of trade policies on relative prices, 
factor payments, sectorial resource allocation, etc., computable general equi- 
librium models (CGEMs) have become over the last decade the empirical tool 
of choice. In this paper, we study the methodology and the impacts of incor- 
porating imperfect competition into CGEMs in the analysis of trade policies 
such as unilateral trade liberalization and regional integration schemes. We be- 
lieve that CGEMs are particularly useful in empirically resolving the theoretical 
ambiguities of trade policy effects under imperfect competition so as to better 
appreciate the likely impacts of trade policy. 
In the presence of monopoly power, it is useful to follow Krugman (1989) 
and classify the analysis of trade policies into three cases: depending on whether 
the monopoly power is exercised by i) domestic firms on the domestic market, 
ii) foreign firms on the domestic market, or iii) both on global markets. 
Monopoly Power Held by Domestic Firms on the Domestic Market 
Despite the virtual absence of empirical studies, there are several reasons 
to believe that non-competitive markets exist in developing countries (cf. in 
particular Rodrik (1988), Krugman (1989) and Lee (1992)). First, barriers 
to the entry of new firms are significant in developing countries: absence of 
antitrust legislation, complex and costly regulatory and licensing procedures, 
the absence of well developed capital markets, etc. Furthermore, in developing 
countries control of major firms is often held by an ethnic minority, a situation 
which can be conducive to collusion. 
In this context, it is ofteti argued that protectionnist trade policies simply 
increase the market power and profits of domestic firms. This can lead to 
a situation where a relatively large number of domestic firms produce at sub- 
optimal levels. If we consider the import substitution trade policies practised by 
many developing country governments since the 1960s, and the limited domestic 
market and excess production capacity observed in most developing nations, the 
argument for the existence of unexploited economies of scale in these countries 
is also very strong. 
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However strong the theoretical case for economies of scale may be, the fact is 
that not many studies have actually found evidence of them. The most compre- 
hensive set of studies on scale economies in developing countries have been made 
in Chile with the work of Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) and Westbrook 
and Tybout (1993) (see also Little (1987)). Tybout (1993) concludes that most 
industries in developing countries (as in developed countries!) do not depart 
significantly from constant returns to scale. He suggests that improvements in 
scale efficiency following a change in trade policy are more likely to come from 
the exit of inefficient firms, giving way to an increase in the production of more 
efficient firms. This is also the conclusion reached by Rodrik (1995). Conse- 
quently, issues of entry/exit and scale economies are closely related. 
Monopoly Power Held by Foreign Firms on the Domestic Market 
When foreign companies hold monopoly power in a market, Brander and 
Spencer (1984) suggest that the local government may be in a position to ex- 
tract monopoly rents from abroad by the imposition of a tariff. Fearful of the 
possibility that local competitors may appropriate some share of the excess prof- 
its, these companies will absorb part of the tariff, bearing in mind the domestic 
demand conditions. The argument advanced by Brander and Spencer is similar 
to that applied to a large country seeking to impose an optimal tariff policy to 
change its terms of trade2. 
The relevance of an optimal tariff policy has come under much criticism (cf. 
Alam (1994)). For example, the optimal intervention by the government re- 
quires knowledge of the demand schedule, which is difficult, if not impossible to 
obtain3. Similarly, the level of the optimal tariff depends upon parameters like 
the price-elasticities of supply and demand which are not readily measurable, 
so the implementation of such a scheme is fraught with difficulties. In addition, 
from a political perspective, the retribution of foreign governments can be dis- 
suasive. Finally, when interest groups are able to control a government's tariff 
policy, serious distortions may result. All things considered, when we take into 
account the small size of many developing countries, we have some serious rea- 
Sons to doubt that they can significantly influence the pricing policy of foreign 
firms in their local markets. 
Monopoly Power Held by Foreign and Domestic Firms on Global Market 
In this third scenario, the government uses trade policy to influence the na- 
ture of the competitive relationship between foreign and domestic firms on the 
global market. A traditional example is the case of a government which uses 
a subsidy to enable domestic producers to assume an aggressively competitive 
stance, thus discouraging entry by foreign firms. The strategic behavior implied 
by the analysis in these models have been mostly applied to global high tech- 
'An argument made by Katrak (1977) 
the opposite case, if there is some market power exerciced by domestic firms on foreign 
markets, the optimal trade policy in terms of national welfare would be an export tax. 
3Some cases are best handled with import tariffs, and others with import subsidies (cf. 
Helpman and Krugman (1989)). 
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nology industries dominated by a few players, such as aircraft manufacturing. 
It has been shown, however, that the optimal policy to follow crucially de- 
pends on the specific behavioral assumptions made (cf. Helpman and Krugman 
(1989)). The absence of a generalized approach detracts from the appeal of these 
theories. In addition, numerical simulations show that not only are welfare gains 
resulting from such policies minimal, but that they can easily be translated into 
welfare losses when the underlying assumptions are modified, sometimes even 
slightly (cf. Dixit (1988), among many others). Finally, as most developing 
countries have small domestic markets, strategic trade policies have little rele- 
vance to them: small countries are rarely home to companies which are major 
international forces in their market, and even when they are, their limited fi- 
nances prevent them from playing an important role in the interactions of these 
companies (Krugman (1989)). 
Consequently, this paper will focus primarily on trade policies affecting the 
monopoly power of domestic firms on the domestic market. We shall pay par- 
ticular attention to the impact of trade liberalization and regional integration 
under conditions of imperfect competition and possible economies of scale. We 
deem these the most pertinent situations to examine for developing countries as 
a whole. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 comprises 
a brief survey of studies using CGEMs with imperfect competition. There have 
been many recent studies examining the impact on an economy of dismantling 
tariff barriers in the presence of monopoly power and inefficient scales of activity 
of domestic firms. As we show in the following section, trade policy measures 
have analytically ambiguous effects under these conditions so that we must use 
applied analysis to better understand its consequences. The fourth section out- 
lines different ways of modelling monopoly power and scale economies on the 
domestic market, and a comparison with perfect competition formulations. This 
section, in addition to clarifying the choices which model builders must make, 
reveals the mechanisms by which the magnitude and even the direction of the 
effects of trade policy may vary depending on whether and how imperfect com- 
petition is incorporated into the model. In a fifth section, we present an example 
of a simple CGEM in which we illustrate the importance and the manner of tak- 
ing imperfect competition into account when analyzing trade liberalization. We 
present some conclusions in a final section. 
2 A Brief Review of the Litterature 
Among developed countries, studies of trade liberalization using CGEMs with 
imperfect competition have focused mainly on Canada. Harris (1984), (1985), 
(1986), Cox and Harris (1985) and Hazeldine (1990) have studied the economic 
costs of existing tariff structures. They estimated the impact of reducing tariffs 
on the allocation of resources and on the level of welfare. Also in Canada, 
Delorme and van der Mensbrugghe (1989) have studied the impact of liberalizing 
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trade in agricultural produce. Finally, in a recent study, Melo and Tarr (1992) 
used a CGEM to analyze foreign trade policy in the United States. 
There have been few CGEMs applications of industrial organization theory 
to trade policy analysis in developing countries despite the extent of policy re- 
forms currently undertaken in these countries. Aside from the work by Melo 
and Roland-Hoist (1991b), (1991a), and (1994) and by Gunasekara and Tyers 
(1991) on South Korea, a country which is better described as newly industrial- 
ized than as developing, we note the studies of trade liberalization in Cameroon 
by Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) and (1991) and in Tunisia by Kress (1995). 
The literature on regional integration was mainly developed to answer ques- 
tions posed by North American and European integration. In North America, 
Wigle (1988) and Brown and Stern (1989a) and (1989b) conducted a number of 
studies to evaluate the impact of the Free Trade Agreement. Among exarnina- 
tions of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, Cox and Harris (1992) and 
Cox (1994) focused on the effects on Canada, while Brown (1992) and (1994) 
and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1992) concentrated on the United States, and 
Sobarzo (1994) on Mexico. Further analysis was conducted on a sectorial basis: 
Cox and Harris (1986) analyzed the effect of the FTA on the Canadian manu- 
facturing sector while Hunter, Markusen, and Rutherford (1992) and Lopez-de 
Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994a) and (1994b) studied NAFTA's im- 
plications for the automobile industry. 
As to Europe, the impetus came from a 1988 study by Smith and Ven- 
ables which, although it took a partial equilibrium approach, introduced a new 
method of modelling regional integration. In addition to the usual tariff re- 
ductions, they assumed that the elimination of trade barriers would render it 
impossible for firms to practise price discrimination on different markets within 
the region, hypothesis which appears to have particular pertinence to the Eu- 
ropean situation. Their partial equilibrium work was later transferred to a 
general equilibrium setting by Gasiorek, Smith, and Venables (1991), Burniaux 
and Waelbroeck (1992) and Kempeneers (1993), Haaland and Norman 
(1992), Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1994), Mercenier (1994a) and (1994b) 
and, respectively with special emphasis on the countries in EFTA5 and Switzer- 
land, Norman (1990) and Antille, Bachetta, Carlevaro, Maranon, Muller, and 
Schmitt (1991). Quite recently, a few models with imperfect competition were 
also built to study the impacts of the Uruguay Round (cf. Haaland and Tollefsen 
(1994) and François, MacDonald, and Nordstrom (1995)). 
As in the case of trade liberalization, few CGEMs incorporating imperfect 
competition have been used to study regional integration in the context of de- 
veloping countries. To our knowledge, only the work by Flôres Jr. (1994), on 
welfare gains associated with MERCOSUL, fits this description. Nonetheless, 
we suspect that imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale are im- 
portant features of these countries (cf. Rodrik (1988)). 
4These authors further assumed that regional integration led to a change in consumers' 
preferences through a change in the elasticity of substitution between products according to 
their origins in the utility functions. 
5The EFTA is comprised of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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Note that it would be dangerous to mechanically apply to developing coun- 
tries models developed for industrial countries without accounting for the sig- 
nificant structural differences which distinguish them. Note, for example, the 
large proportion of imports used as intermediate inputs, the higher degree of 
structural rigidity impeding the entry and exit of firms, the preponderance of 
excess profits, and the tendency of international trade to be inter-, rather than 
intra-, industry. All of these factors may, if they are correctly incorporated, 
change the conclusions for developing economies. 
3 Ambiguous Effects of Trade Policy 
From a theoretical perspective, the introduction of imperfect competition may 
significantly modify the results of trade policy analysis in CGEMs. As previ- 
ously indicated, we shall examine trade liberalization and regional integration, 
and focus on impacts on welfare, sectorial resource allocation and factor pay- 
ments. In this section, references to trade liberalization specifically pertain to 
the elimination or reduction of tariffs and quotas. 
3.1 Resource Allocation 
In standard CGEMs with perfect competition, reductions in trade barriers lead 
to a decrease in relative prices in the protected sectors (usually manufacturing, 
in developing countries) and a corresponding increase in the relative prices of 
the sectors which are less sheltered (usually agriculture). These relative price 
changes induce a reallocation of resources from the formerly protected sectors to 
the others; that is, a contraction in manufacturing production and an expansion 
in agricultural production. Trade liberalization similarly encourages an outward 
orientation of the economy as it increases the price of exports relative to import- 
competing products. 
However, if firms in the protected sectors operate under conditions of im- 
perfect competition, this may modify these conclusions. Consider the example, 
illustrated in figure 1 in which a single firm satisfies the entire demand for a 
given good; the case of pure monopoly. If this good is an imperfect substi- 
tute for some imported goods, reductions in trade barriers will have two effects. 
Consumers will reallocate some expenditures to now cheaper imports and conse- 
quently reduce their purchases of domestic goods. This causes a shifting inward 
of the demand curve. Secondly, the increased competition from foreign firms 
will reduce the monopoly power of the domestic producer. This results in an 
increase in the slope of the demand and marginal revenue curves facing him. 
This is the pro-competitive effect of liberalization. 
While the first (demand) effect tends to reduce the output of the domestic 
producer, the second (supply) effect tend to increase it as the firm reduces its 
mark-up and increase production closer to optimal levels. It is impossible to 
know, a priori, whether the monopoly's output will increase or decrease. In 
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Figure 1: Ambiguous effects of trade liberalization 
panel A, trade liberalization causes a decrease in production. The opposite 
effect is illustrated in panel B. An applied analysis is needed to know the more 
likely result in any particular sector and country. 
It is still true that the sectors which were previously highly protected will 
tend to experience the largest influx of competing imports and, consequently, 
the largest inward shift in the demand curve subsequent to trade liberalization. 
However, if these sectors are also monopolistic or oligopolistic (often the case 
in highly protected sectors), they will react to this increased competition and 
resulting decline in their monopoly power, by reducing their mark-up and in- 
creasing production. As imperfect competition is generally more prevalent in 
highly protected sectors, manufacturing in particular, this pro-competitive ef- 
fect is strongest in these sectors. In theory, it can be sufficiently strong that the 
highly protected sectors actually increase output after trade liberalization while 
the others contract. Contrary to traditional conclusions, agriculture production 
and exports could actually decline while manufacturing and import- competing 
production could increase. 
In the case of regional integration schemes, traditional resource allocation 
effects depend upon how the relative price structure in the economy is modified 
by changes in regional and external tariffs rates. As these schemes imply a 
reduction in tariff rates on intra-regional trade, sectors which export within the 
region are expected to expand while those which compete on the local market 
with regional imports contract. The impact on sectors which compete on the 
local market with extra-regional imports depends on whether a common external 
tariff is established and whether this tariff is superior or inferior to the pre- 
existing external tariff rate in the country. While extra-regional export tariffs 
are not necessarily modified in regional integration schemes, changes in the 
prices of other goods modify their relative prices and their relative attraction 
for resources. 
Taking into account imperfect competition within the region may, once 
again, modify these traditional results. Sectors which face increased compe- 
A B 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 7 
tition on the local or regional market as a result of the RI scheme are tradi- 
tionally expected to contract. However, if these sectors are also characterized 
by imperfect competition, they will react to this increased competition, and the 
consequent decline in their market power, by lowering their mark-up rate. This 
will lessen the decline in their production and potentially lead to an expansion 
in their output. 
Consequently, it is necessary to turn to empirical studies. Given the mag- 
nitude of changes involved in most trade liberalization episodes and the need 
for detailed sectorial analysis, CGEMs are the appropriate tool. The ambigu- 
ous effects of trade policy in the allocation of resources has been illustrated in 
several CGEMs. Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) find that subsequent to trade 
liberalization in Cameroon, manufacturing increases while agricultural produc- 
tion declines. In Harris (1984), simulations of trade liberalization in Canada 
with perfect competition show a contraction in the manufacturing sector while 
the opposite occurs when imperfect competition is taken into account. Harris 
(1984) notes that, with imperfect competition, the direction of the variations in 
production changes in almost half of the sectors. Note that these effects depend 
on the prior structure of protection. In Europe, where protection is concen- 
trated on the perfectly competitive agricultural sector, Harrison, Rutherford, 
and Tarr (1994) find that changes in output are in the same direction whether 
imperfect competition in the industrial sector is incorporated or not. In this 
case, the pro-competitive and the demand effects act in the same direction and, 
consequently, variations in output are greater in the oligopolistic case. 
In the same way, taking into account imperfect competition may modify the 
conclusions as to the structure of trade following trade liberalization. In the em- 
pirical litterature, the inclusion of imperfect competition increases estimations 
of the volume of inter-industry trade after regional integration in brown and 
Stern (1989a) and Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1994). It also appears that, 
in general, perfect competition models show a strong tendency toward increased 
intra-industry trade while the opposite occurs in monopolistic models. These 
results illustrate the importance of accounting for imperfect competition when 
evaluating the effects of trade policy measures on resource allocation. 
3.2 Welfare 
In the preceding section, we saw that, depending on the relative importance 
of the demand and pro-competitive effects, production in previously protected 
sectors could either increase or decrease following trade liberalization or re- 
gional integration. The question we now address is which of these results is 
more desirable from a welfare point of view. The traditional approach to trade 
policy analysis focuses on the welfare gains anticipated from the elimination of 
distortions in domestic prices relative to world prices and the consequent real- 
location of domestic resources from protected to unprotected sectors. However, 
if protected sectors are characterized by the presence of imperfect competition, 
it is possible that they are producing at sub-optimal rather than supra-optimal 
levels. If so, a contraction of these sectors could be welfare-reducing. This 
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possibility is even greater if these same sectors have unexploited economies of 
scale. 
Rodrik (1988) has proposed a simple analytical model of the possible gains 
and losses from tariff reform in the presence of non-competitive markets and 
economies of scale. We shall ignore income effects and represent the economy 
by an expenditure function E(p, W), where p is the vector of prices and W 
an index of welfare. E represents the smallest expenditure compatible with a 
welfare level W. From the envelope theorem, consumption of i, denoted is 
equal to the partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the 
price of good i. If we assume that each sector i consists of identical firms, 
then a representative firm's output, is equal to the total production in the 
sector, divided by 
The technology of industry i is characterized by a unit cost function c2 (w, x2), 
where w represents the vector of payments to factors. Since x2 is an argument 
of cO, this model allows for increasing returns to scale, in which case the partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to the firm's production is strictly 
less than zero. Application of Sheppard's lemma to the cost function yields the 
factor demand for each unit produced. Equation (3.1) ensures equality between 
supply and demand in the factor market: 
\fj, (3.1) 
where is the economy's fixed endowment of the j-th factor of production. Net 
imports of i, are simply equal to the difference between domestic demand 
and supply X1 as, in this model, domestic and foreign goods are assumed to 
be homogeneous. 
We may represent the initial equilibrium in the economy with the equality 
of aggregate income and aggregate demand. In our model national income is 
the sum of three elements: i) rents accruing from quotas and income generated 
by tariffs, ii) pure profits, and iii) factor income. Consequently, the national 
accounting identity may be written: 
E() = — + — + (3.2) 
where p, and p are, respectively, the domestic and foreign prices of good i. 
While we do not explicitly consider intermediate demand, X, may be interpreted 
as net production. 
Now, let us examine a partial tariff reform. What will be the welfare effects? 
We begin our analysis by totally differentiating equation (3.4) and evaluating 
the derivative in the neighborhood of the initial equilibrium. After several sub- 
stitutions and supposing that = 0, we obtain: 
(a) (b) (c) 
— + — c)dX2 + — —]dx2 (3.3) 
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where g2 is the scale parameter and is equal to the ratio of average cost to 
marginal cost. 
Each of the three effects, (a), (b), and (c), correspond to a unique source 
of market failure. Expression (a) shows that it is desirable to increase imports 
of protected goods or, as M, = C, + to increase domestic consumption and 
reduce the domestic production of these goods (the demand effect of section 
3.1). The ensuing welfare gains will be directly proportional to the size of the 
initial gap between domestic and global prices caused by tariffs. This is the 
traditional welfare gain associated with trade liberalization; trade barriers lead 
to sub-optimal levels of imports and consumption and supra-optimal levels of 
production of protected goods. 
Expression (b) reflects excess profits. In non-competitive industries the mar- 
ket price is higher than marginal costs which suggests that local producers 
operate at sub-optimal levels. In consequence, expression (b) demonstrates that 
welfare gains can be expected if increased competition brought on by trade lib- 
eralization or regional integration leads to an increase in production in these 
non-competitive sectors (the supply effect of section 3.1). 
However, a sector may be affected simultaneously by these two market im- 
perfections. In developing countries, manufacturing sectors are usually heavily 
protected and also show a tendency to having a non-competitive market struc- 
ture. Under these conditions, it is unclear whether they are producing sub- 
or supra-optimally and, consequently, whether it is desirable from a welfare 
viewpoint that they contract or expand. If we substitute dM2 = + 
into expression (a), we can resolve this ambiguity. Ignoring, for the moment, 
expression (c), equation (3.3) becomes: 
EQ = — p)dC2 + — c20]dX2 (3.4) 
Thus, it becomes clear that an increase in the production of a sector is desirable 
if it produces at a marginal cost which is inferior to the world price, and a 
contraction is preferable on the contrary. Rodrik (1988) argues that the latter 
case is more probable as unit costs tend to be higher in highly protected sectors. 
Term (c) captures the influence of possible economies of scale. This term 
will be positive in the case of increasing returns to scale. If industries charac- 
terized by increasing returns to scale already produce at costs inferior to world 
prices, this will simply add to the welfare gains (losses) to be expected from 
their expansion (contraction). However, if their costs are initially above world 
prices, this effect will reduce or possibly eliminate the welfare losses (gains) to 
be expected from their expansion (contraction). 
There remain some issues which have not been addressed. In particular, this 
model does not reflect possible welfare gains from an increase in the variety of 
products available. This is likely to be non-negligible in developing countries 
subsequent to trade liberalization. Also, the process by which firms enter and 
exit non-competitive markets is not explicitly accounted for in this model 
6See the work of Melo and Roland-Hoist (1991a). 
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If, subsequent to trade liberalization, inefficient companies are squeezed out, 
the three previously identified effects (a), (b), and (c) may all work in the same 
direction. If a large number of firms exit, the remaining firms would produce 
at a larger scale even if total production stagnates or declines. Hence, this 
rationalization effect may enhances welfare through the scale effect previously 
mentioned. The most commonly made assumption is that, as the industry's 
profit levels fall with the elimination of tariff protection and export subsidies, 
some firms will exit the market. If the industries in question are characterized 
by economies of scale, the welfare of the entire economy will tend to increase. 
The consensus which appears to be emerging from analysis performed with 
CGEMs with economies of scale and imperfect competition is that accounting 
for monopoly power by domestic firms magnifies the benefits resulting from 
trade liberalization and regional integration (cf. a review of the literature by 
Richardson (1990)). Harris (1984) estimated possible welfare gains of 8% to 10% 
of GDP for the Canadian economy. Hazeldine (1990), for Canada, and Nguyen 
and Wigle (1992), for estimates of world multilateral liberalization, show similar 
but not as large results about the effect of taking into account imperfect com- 
petition although Hazeldine finds that this result is sensitive to the hypotheses 
concerning firm behavior. Total welfare gains double in the monopolistic model 
of Brown and Stern (1989a) relative to the perfection competition case. The 
inclusion of imperfect competition has a similar effect in Norman (1990) and 
François, MacDonald, and Nordstrom (1995) as welfare also roughly doubles. 
In studies of developing countries the benefits are equally significant. Es- 
timates by Gunasekara and Tyers (1991) in the case of South Korea are of a 
similar order. Studying Cameroon, Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) obtain wel- 
fare gains of 0.5% when they assume perfectly competitive markets, and 2% 
when imperfectly competitive markets and economies of scale are incorporated. 
Although welfare increases when imperfect competition is taken into account, 
one should note that the effect is not as strong as in Gunasekara and Tyers's 
model. In fact, the results of the two models differ in the way firms respond to 
trade liberalization. While the rationalization process is important in Gunasek- 
era and Tyer's results, it is practically absent in Devarajan and Rodrik (1991)'s 
model. However, both studies underscore the importance of accounting for im- 
perfect competition and economies of scale when analyzing the benefits of trade 
liberalization policies. 
3.3 Payments to Factors 
We conclude this section with a short note on the possible effects of trade 
policy on payments to factors. In a model with two mobile factors (labor and 
capital), a decrease in tariffs will normally have the effect of increasing payments 
to the factor which is used relatively less intensively in the protected sector 
by increasing the value of its marginal product (the Stolper-Samuelson effect). 
Consequently one of the two factors will have its real income reduced from the 
tariff reduction. 
In empirical studies it has sometimes been observed that other effects may 
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come into play. As we have seen, taking into account imperfect competition 
may imply that the protected sector expands, increasing payments to the factor 
which is used relatively more intensively in this sector. Concretely, if we assume 
that the industrial sector is protected and relatively intensive in capital, wages 
may fall rather than increase following trade liberalization. The introduction of 
increasing returns to scale will have an additional impact on these conclusions. 
If scale effects resulting from the liberalization are sufficiently positive, it is 
conceivable that the two factors will split the gain from increases in production 
in such a manner that real incomes in terms of domestic production will increase 
for both. 
An illustration of this can be found in Brown (1994). In her model of 
NAFTA, returns to both capital and labor increase in the three countries. In the 
case of United States this is due to changes in terms of trade, as its economy 
was the least protected before integration. For Mexico and Canada, positive 
scale effects explain this result. 
In consequence, we cannot determine on a theoretical basis whether or not 
a factor will gain from liberalization. The evolution of factors' income will 
depend on these three effects7, namely the Stolper-Samuelson effect, the pro- 
competitive effect and, finally, effects on the scale of production. Once again, 
empirical analysis taking into account imperfect competition is required if we 
wish to have more precise answers. 
4 Market Structure 
As we saw in the preceding sections, the inclusion of imperfectly competitive 
markets in CGEMs is increasingly preoccupying researchers in trade policy. 
However, to date no consensus has emerged as to the best way to integrate 
these features into these models and into economic theory in general. This 
section presents a brief survey of how firm behavior is modelled in the economic 
literature, particularly in the CGEM literature. In addition to clarifying the 
choices which model builders must make, this section reveals the mechanisms 
by which the magnitude and even the direction of the effects of trade policy 
may vary depending on whether and how imperfect competition is incorporated 
into the model. 
For each case we shall analyze the implications in terms of model building, 
the realism of the underlying assumptions and the likely impacts on the results 
of trade liberalization. We also take into account the broader general equilib- 
rium context within which the relevant market operates. Our review will not 
dwell on the technical aspects of the models, we will simply refer the reader to 
relevant studies. We will first see the case in which all the firms in a same sector 
produce a homogeneous good. We will suppose further that the sector's pro- 
ducers compete with foreign goods (imports) which are imperfect substitutes. 
This is the familiar Armington approach where products are differentiated at 
the national level. 
7Abstracting from changes in the terms of trade. 
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perfect monopolistic oligopoly monopoly 
competition competition 
number of sellers: many many few one 
product type: homogeneous differentiated both one 
barriers to entry: none weak important important 
infinite -. 
where: 
= market price-elasticity of demand for domestic good 
& = elasticity of substitution among varieties 
= firm's market share 
= price elasticity of the firm's demand 
Table 1: Market Taxonomy 
An alternative approach, used in some of the studies presented in the pre- 
ceding section, would be to consider that foreign and domestic goods are perfect 
substitutes. However, it should be noted that under these conditions, imperfect 
competition is possible only in the presence of a quota. Otherwise, the domes- 
tic producer would simply be forced to charge a price equal to the world price 
multiplied by one plus the tariff rate. 
In section 4.1.1, we will quickly recall the basic elements of our reference 
model - perfect competition - then we will examine, in turn, monopoly and 
oligopoly cases. The following section will present the case of firm-level product 
differentiation in oligopoly models. In table 1, the reader will find a summary 
of the various market structures we will review. A final subsection deals with 
the modelling of returns to scale. 
As we made clear in the introduction, we are concerned here primarily with 
market structure on a domestic or regional market and therefore exclude from 
our analysis strategic trade policy issues popularized by Krugman. The lat- 
ter, generally involving high-technology world markets such as for airplanes and 
micro-chips, requires an entirely different theoretical framework, and is of lim- 
ited interest outside these few industries. For a review of this literature, see 
Brander (1995). Consequently, market structure is defined solely relative to 
domestic firms or, in the case of multi-country regional integration models, in 
terms of firms implanted within the region. As we will see below, foreign com- 
petition and, consequently, Devarajan and Rodrik's pro-competitive effects, are 
taken into account through their impact on the slope of the market demand 
curve (price-elasticity) faced by local firms. Foreign firms are assumed to be 
perfectly competitive although they produce imperfect substitutes for domestic 
goods. The latter therefore have their own distinct market demand curve. 




Figure 2: Perfect Competition 
4.1 Homogeneous Goods 
4.1.1 Perfect Competition 
The Wairasian model of general equilibrium under perfect competition pos- 
tulates a finite but large number of producers, consumers and goods in the 
economy; the latter may be both inputs to and outputs of a production process. 
On the production side, returns to scale are non-increasing, production without 
inputs is impossible, complete inactivity is possible and the production process 
is irreversible. Each producer maximizes total profits over a given vector of 
exogenous prices, (cf. Decaluwé and Martens (1988)). It is this last assumption 
which is characteristic of perfect competition. 
In CGEMs with perfect competition, we postulate that the economy is di- 
vided into branches, and that there is a sufficiently large number of firms per 
branch so that each one assumes that the impact of its output on the market 
price is negligible; each firm produces a tiny proportion of the total output in its 
branch. Clearly, if all the firms simultaneously decide to increase production, 
we expect the market price to fall. The important fact here is that under perfect 
competition the marginal revenue of an individual firm is constant and equal to 
p, the market price. It is not the same as the marginal revenue associated with 
the entire market or branch (see figure 2). 
Algebraically, the firm's problem is: 
maxpx—c(x) (4.1) 
where x represents output, p the constant market price, and c(x) the cost func- 
tion. The first order condition is simply that the firm sets production levels 
such that marginal cost equals market price: 
pCx(X) (4.2) 
Branch 
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This condition is rarely explicitly introduced into CGEMs with perfect compe- 
tition. It is implicit, however, in the factor demand functions which equalize 
the value of the marginal product of each factor with its marginal cost. 
Furthermore, when the ii firms are identical, each one produces the same 
share of the total output of branch X, that is In this case it is not necessary 
to model each firm individually. Most models make the assumption that there is 
a representative firm for the branch and that the entire branch can be captured 
in its behavior. 
Given condition (4.2) and the absence of internal returns to scale in the 
perfect competition model, equation (3.3) simply becomes: 
EwdW = (4.3) 
Three main points can be made about the welfare effect of trade liberaliza- 
tion from this simplification of equation (3.3). First, in the absence of other 
distortions in the economy, evaluation of welfare gains will be unambiguously 
positive. Second, these gains will come exclusively from the reallocation of 
resources from formerly relatively protected to formerly unprotected sectors. 
Suppose that agricultural is the relatively unprotected sector and let PIND, 
PAGR, XIND and XAGR be the price and level of production of the agricultural 
and industrial good respectively. Following trade liberalization, PAGR/PIND 
will increase given that PIND PAGR. This change in relative price will 
render production in the agricultural sector more profitable, giving way to an 
increase in the production in this sector. The inverse argument can be made 
for the industrial sector. Finally, we see from equation (4.3) that the welfare 
gains resulting trade liberalization in a context of perfect competition will be, 
as we said before, proportional to the former wedge between domestic and in- 
ternational price. In that case, welfare effects of trade liberalization tend be 
relatively small (see /citeNDecaluwé/Martens: 1988). 
As we have seen earlier, the effects of regional integration depend on the 
details of the scheme. However, it is still true that only the traditional demand 
effect, and not the pro-competitive or scale effects, come into play if imperfect 
competition is not taken into account. 
4.1.2 Monopoly 
In the case of a monopoly, there is only one firm producing a given good. This 
firm faces total market demand as the demand for its product, and production 
in the branch is equal to production of the firm: X = x. When, as usual, the 
market demand schedule is downward sloping, the firm must make a trade-off 
between price and quantity. In other words, the firm's marginal revenue is below 
the market price; if one more unit is sold, the price of all the other units it sells 
must fall. Marginal revenue is thus equal to the price of the extra unit minus 
the revenue lost due to the decrease in the price of all other units. 
Algebraically, the firm knows that the market price is determined by its 
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Figure 3: Monopoly 
output level, so that p = p(X). The monopolist's maximization problem is: 
maxp(X)X — c(X) (4.4) 
The first order condition of this problem is: 
p(X) + aX = cx(X) (4.5) 
In consequence, we see that to the extent that the demand schedule is downward 
sloping < 0, marginal revenue (mr)8 will lie below the market price, p. 
Furthermore, as we see in figure 3, the price charged by the firm will exceed 
marginal cost, and hence will be greater than the price which would prevail 
under perfect competition. A monopolistic market structure will thus yield a 
higher price and a lower output than perfect competition. 




where represents the monopolist's mark-up rate and e is the price elasticity 
of demand in the branch, e = ci. Equation (4.6) is often called the Lerner 
equation, it results directly from profit optimization by the firm. We see that 
more the demand for the monopolist's good is inelastic (e small), the greater 
will be his mark-up. 
e is generally determined endogenously by the model based, however, on a 
partial equilibrium derivation of the demand function. In particular, it does 
8Note that in this case the firm's marginal revenue (rnr) is equal to the marginal revenue 
for the branch (MR). Also the price-elasticity of demand within the branch e is equal to the 
price-elasticity perceived by the firm, 
x. 
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not incorporate income effects which a change in output or price may engen- 
der. To illustrate, assume that the demand facing the producer comes from a 
representative agent who has a linear demand for a composite good which is a 
CES aggregate composed of the imported and domestic goods. In this case, the 
partial equilibrium derivation of the price-elasticity of demand for the domestic 
good is: 
pdxd 
= [aj + (1 — cri)pdXdz (4.7) 
where and pm represent the prices of the domestic good d and of the im- 
ported good m in sector i, respectively; and represent the volume of the 
domestic good and the imported good consumed domestically; and represents 
the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and imported goods. 
How will incorporating the monopolistic behavior of certain sectors likely 
modify the simulation results obtained from a CGEM relative to the case of 
perfect competition? We can see that e, varies positively with the relative 
price of imports (Pr/P'). Consequently, trade liberalization will diminish the 
mark-up charged by domestic firms and cause them to increase production. 
This is the pro-competitive effect described by Itodrik (1988) which, as we have 
seen, goes counter to the traditional negative effect of trade liberalization on 
output in highly protected sectors. The extent of this pro-competitive effect 
depends fundamentally on the variation in e, subsequent to trade liberalization. 
From equation (4.7), the variation in ej is determined by the extent of trade 
liberalization For a given variation in P2tm, the magnitude of the pro- 
competitive effect varies positively with the share of the domestic good in total 
domestic consumption and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods. 
As for the probable welfare effects, equation (3.3) becomes: 
EQ = — 
+ cx(X) dx, (4.8) 
The smaller is the greater is the monopolist's monopoly power and markup 
and the more likely it is that he is producing sub-optimally. Thus the smaller is 
the greater are the welfare gains (losses) to be expected from the expansion 
(contraction) of this sector. 
4.1.3 Oligopoly 
In contrast to monopoly, with a single firm per branch, and perfect competition, 
with a large number of firms per branch, the oligopolistic market is character- 
ized by the presence of a small number of large firms relative to the market. 
Unlike producers in monopoly and perfect competition, oligopolists must take 
into consideration the possible actions of other firms in the branch. We can 
distinguish between models in which those firms behave in a cooperative or a 
non-cooperative way. 
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Cooperative oligopoly: Collusion Collusion is a situation in which firms 
agree among themselves to jointly fix prices or production levels in order to 
maximize profits over the entire branch. The optimal strategy is for these firms 
to fix the market price at the level which would prevail under monopoly, and 
then distribute the resulting profits proportionally among themselves. Note 
that this type of arrangement may be very difficult to maintain, as each firm 
has an incentive to cheat and sell more than its allotted quota as long as the 
others are respecting the agreement. In consequence, there are some conditions 
which are more conducive to collusion than others. For example, if there is a 
credible threat to respond rapidly to cheating, barriers to entry, a small number 
of firms, or if the firms have symmetric cost structures, collusion is more likely 
or, at least, more sustainable (cf. Tirole (1988)). 
With a profit-maximizing collusion, the pro-competitive and welfare effects 
of trade policy are identical to those of a monopoly provided that the collusion 
does not break apart as a result of the modified trade policy environment. 
The Eastman-Stykolt Hypothesis In a context in which a domestic in- 
dustry faces foreign competition, the presence of policies to protect the domestic 
market, which result in a domestic price above the international price, provides 
a natural framework for collusion. In this context, Harris (1984) introduced the 
idea of a focal price as a collusion mechanism for local firms. Domestic producers 
agree to sell at the world price plus the applicable tariff, thus preventing foreign 
competition. Let represent the tariff rate imposed on good i at the border, 
then the price of the import competing good may be set at: p (1 + .The 
existence of this target price facilitates collusion. This form of price collusion 
has been designated under the name of "Eastman Stykolt" hypothesis Eastman 
and Stykolt (1966). 
Note that under these conditions, the domestic price simply falls in the 
same proportion as the import price subsequent to trade liberalization. The 
pro-competitive effect in this scenario is thus much greater than with profit- 
maximizing collusion. The likelihood that production is sub-optimal under this 
scenario, and the resulting welfare gains (losses) to be expected from an expan- 
sion (contraction) of this sector, would be greater than with profit-maximizing 
collusion if, for the same unit cost, the domestic price is higher; that is: 
p*(i + t) > + 
While the hypothesis of a focal price has been used by Delorme and van der 
Mensbrugghe (1989) and Nguyen and Wigle (1992), this approach is open to 
criticism. First, as domestic and imported goods are assumed to be imper- 
fect substitutes, this price setting behavior does not, in effect, prevent foreign 
competition nor maximize profits. Further, Wigle (1988) emphasized that the 
conditions for such effective collusion are rarely observed, particularly the pres- 
ence of significant barriers to entry. He also notes that the application of the 
"Eastman Stykolt" assumption leads to exaggeration of the potential welfare 
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gains resulting from the elimination of tariffs by supposing such an implausible 
market structure. Also, it should be noted that this pricing hypothesis is purely 
ad hoc. It is not inferred from any profit maximization problem: the firm does 
not recognize the market power embodied in the use of the national product 
differentiation hypothesis (see section 4.2) 
Non-Cooperative Oligopoly In contrast to collusion, firms do not coordi- 
nate their actions when they act in non-cooperative ways. Two main formula- 
tions may be conceived: firms compete based either on prices, or on quantities. 
In the Cournot model, firms choose the quantity they will produce, with the 
price determined by the market. In the Bertrand model, on the other hand, 
prices are set by firms which then sell all they can at that price. The two mod- 
els share the assumption that firms take their competitors behavior as given 
when deciding their own strategy. In fact, these models are purely static by 
definition; the firm does not form expectations as to how the others may react 
to its decisions. A third formulation allows this expectation to be taken into 
account: the conjectural variations model. However, this model also has its 
weaknesses which we shall discuss later. 
We are particularly interested in the optimal decision rule of firms in oligopolis- 
tic markets. Be it because of the small number of firms in the market, or 
because of product differentiation, firms in oligopoly possess a certain degree 
of monopoly power allowing them to set prices above marginal cost, as in the 
case of monopolists. We shall see that the size of the gap between price and 
marginal cost and, consequently, the magnitude of the pro- competitive and 
welfare effects of trade liberalization, depends upon the nature of the competi- 
tion between firms as well as on the degree of product differentiation and their 
market share. 
The Cournot Model with Homogenous Products A Cournot-Nash equi- 
librium occurs when each firm's expectation as to their rival's level of produc- 
tion is verified. It is possible to derive an expression for the company's optimal 
mark-up from the profit maximization problem. This problem is written: 
rnaxp(X)x2 — (4.9) 
where X represents total production in the branch and is equal to if 
we assume that there are n firms in the industry. The firms marginal cost is 
assumed constant at First order conditions for firm i are: 
p(X) + (4.10) 
9Models where collusion would be on stronger theoretical ground may be found, for exam- 
ple, in Rothemberg and Saloner (1986) and (1990). 
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This equation may be solved for the markup10, yielding: 
p(X) — Sj 
4 11 
p(X) e (. 
where is the market share of firm i equal to and the price elasticity of 
demand within the branch. If we suppose that all firms are identical, then the 
market share of a representative firm will be equal to The optimal mark-up 
will therefore be: 
p(X) — = 
(4 12) 
p(X) flE 
where the price-elasticity faced by the firm is equal to nE. 
Note that the Cournot model generates a form of mark-up on marginal costs 
with some interesting properties: 
1. Each firm recognizes that it has some degree of monopoly power. 
2. As in the case of monopoly, this monopoly power is an inverse function of 
the market price-elasticity. 
3. This gap is also proportional to the firm's market share. 
4. In this perspective, we see that the Cournot equilibrium is an intermediate 
form between monopoly = 1) and perfect competition 0). 
From equations 4.11 and 4.12, we see that the mark-up of the oligopolist 
will be less than that of a monopolist. Consequently, if a branch is oligopolistic 
rather than monopolistic, its level of production will be higher. It follows that 
the pro-competitive and welfare effects will not be as strong as in the monopoly 
case while they increase with 
It is of some use to examine how marginal revenue, as perceived by the firm 
in the Cournot model, compares to marginal revenue in monopoly. We can, in 
fact, show that it is a weighted average of marginal revenue in monopoly and in 
perfect competition (cf. figure 4) (respectively, MR and P): 
mr(.) = + (1- (4.13) 
where n is the number of firm in the sector. Thus, the optimal decision for 
the firm does not correspond to the point where marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue. This is because each firm calculates its marginal revenue taking as 
given not only the price of the foreign imports but the output of the other 
firms of the sector as well. However, the Cournot model has been subject to 
several criticisms. The main one being that firms' choice variable is price, not 
quantity". At the time, this was Bertrand's criticism. 
10We divide through by p and multiply the second term of equation (4.10) by substituting 
the price-elasticity of demand e, defined as , and reorganizing noting that = OX, 
we obtain equation (4.11). 
11Recently, models have been built in which firms first choose the production capacity, then 
compete on price. Under certain restrictive assumptions (cf. Tirole (1988)) the results of this 
behavior will be the same as those of a Cournot model. 
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Figure 4: Oligopoly 
The Bertrand Model with Homogenous Products In the Bertrand model, 
each firm sets its own price on the assumption that competitors' prices are fixed. 
With homogenous products, equilibrium occurs when price is equal to marginal 
cost, just as in perfect competition. To see that this must be so, consider the case 
of a firm which sets a higher price. Any other firm will be able to appropriate 
the entire market by charging slightly less. Therefore, the only stable equilib- 
rium results when all firms set their price at marginal cost. This is known as the 
Bertrand paradox, and it is indeed paradoxical for a market with an arbitrarily 
small number of firms to behave so competitively. The operative question in 
this case is whether the firms' products are homogeneous or display some degree 
of differentiation. In the presence of differentiation, the Bertrand model yields 
less paradoxical results, as we shall see in the next section. With homogeneous 
products, it is unrealistic for firms to expect no price reaction from their rivals. 
Of course, trade liberalization yields only the traditional results under these 
conditions. 
Conjectural Variations In the Cournot and Bertrand models, the behavior 
of a firm's rivals is exogenous to the firm's decision. However, it is generally 
admitted that a firm's rivals will modify their own decisions in reaction to the 
firm's decisions. The conjectural variations hypothesis was introduced to cap- 
ture these reactions. A firm's conjectural variation is defined as its expectation 
of how competitors will respond to a change in its production (Cournot) or 
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constitutes the firm's expectation of its rivals' response. The Lerner equation 
can be rewritten to incorporate these expectations: 
= i,.. (4.16) 
When all firms are identical s = and = n—i we obtain a situation of price- 
maximizing collusion as it implies that all competitors match firm i's changed 
strategy. Then, the firm cannot expect to increase its market share by raising 
production, and is better off producing its share of the collusive output and 
receiving a mark-up which reflects monopoly profits. 
Cournot and Bertrand behavior are also special cases of equation (4.16), the 
former when is equal to 0, that is when competitors are expected to keep their 
production constant; and the latter when the conjecture is such that other firms 
will cut their output just enough to keep their own prices constant. In this latter 
case, the value of will depend on the slope of the demand function. Thus, the 
pro-competitive and welfare effects will resemble those of the preceding market 
structures according to the value taken by 
The concept of conjectural variations has been severely criticized from a the- 
oretical perspective. According to Shapiro (1989), the underlying idea is concep- 
tually false, as it attempts to capture dynamic behavior in a static formulation12. 
Furthermore, conjectural variations are inherently difficult, if not impossi- 
ble, to quantify. A number of authors use the concept to reconcile divergences 
between independent estimations of the left-hand side of equation (4.16)13, de- 
termined by evaluations of returns to scale and profits, with the right-hand side, 
determined by econometric estimations of the price elasticity of demand in the 
market. 
Another problem with this approach is that there is no reason to assume that 
the firm's expectations will remain the same in the event of a policy change, 
such as trade liberalization. Rather, we would expect them to change. There 
are, however, no rules regarding their evolution. Melo and Tarr (1992) assume 
that the change in conjectures will be proportional to the entry or exit of firms 
from the market. If (= 1 + is the initial conjecture, it will evolve according 
to: 
= (4.17) 
where represents the initial number of firms and N2 the number at equilib- 
rium. While arbitrary, this formulation reflects the fact that if the number of 
firms increases, the coefficient of conjectural variation will diminish, and the 
market will approach the competitive equilibrium. 
'2Shapiro adds: "This is a fortiori true for the so-called "consistent conjectures" which 
impose the requirements that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, a firm's conjecture 
about a rival's response equal the slope of that rival's reaction curve". 
'3Consider, for example, Kempeneers (1993), Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1994), Lopez-dc 
Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994b), and Mercenier (1994a). 
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4.2 The Case of Differentiated Products 
We have seen examples in the preceding section where, while the domestic sector 
was producing a homogeneous good, this good was an imperfect substitute for 
imports. That is the assumption that products are differentiated according to 
their geographic origin (the Armington (1969) hypothesis). According to this 
hypothesis, consumers consider domestic and foreign products to be imperfect 
substitutes. This assumption is useful to explain the relatively stable market 
shares we observe in international trade. Usually, this hypothesis is modelled 
with a functional form such as the CES in which the aggregate foreign good and 
the aggregate domestic good are imperfectly substitutable like the example we 
saw earlier. A similar distinction is made on export markets. 
This assumption has come under some criticisms. Brown and Stern (1989a) 
have illustrated some consequences of employing this assumption instead of 
modelling product differentiation directly at the firm level. In this latter case, 
each firm, home or foreign, produce a differentiated product. 
Although several good arguments may be advanced in the defence of the 
Armington hypothesis, like real differences between imported goods and their 
domestic substitutes including: the manufacturing technology, the production 
standards under which they were made, distribution channels, etc., modelers 
should be aware of the consequences of such a specific formulation and be ready 
to try some alternatives such as directly modelling product differentiation at 
the firm level. 
Under these circumstances, the decision whether and how to model product 
differentiation at the firm level seems more important. Some authors have com- 
pletely avoided the Armington approach by modelling product differentiation 
only at the firm level (cf. Norman (1990), Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1994)). 
Others have incorporated both concepts. In this case, a third level is built into 
the utility function: expenditure on imports is divided between different coun- 
tries subsequent to the decision on how much of the domestic aggregate and 
how much of the foreign aggregate to buy 14• 
Accounting for product differentiation at the firm level implies changing how 
demand is specified in CGEMs. We shall begin by examining these changes, 
using the methodology introduced by Spence (1976a), (197Gb) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) (SDS)'5. Next we shall look at different ways of modelling product 
141n their research on the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United-States, 
Brown and Stern (1989a) draw attention to some issues arising from applying this hypothesis 
in models with product differentiation at the firm. In particular, the introduction of Arming- 
ton hypothesis introduces a bias in results on intra-branch adjustment, weakens the results 
of rationalization associated with factor intensities, and increases the monopoly effect on do- 
mestic markets, leading to a higher optimal tariff. From an empirical perspective, Brown and 
Stern conclude that the Armington hypothesis yields a good approximation for intra-industry 
trade, but performs poorly on the level of evaluating welfare changes and inter-industry trade. 
Similar criticisms can be found in Norman (1990). 
15A different approach to product differentiation was proposed by Lancaster-Hotelling (see 
the description in Vousden (Vousden 1990)). Briefly, this method assumes that the consumer 
selects from a set of available products the one whose characteristics most closely match his 
tastes. Unfortunately, an analytical treatment of this model requires the imposition of several 
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differentiation at the firm level. Unlike product differentiation at the country 
level, product differentiation at the firm level implies that the firms will behave 
in a non-competitive manner, each firm having monopoly power over the variety 
it produce. As a result, we will examine how trade policy may influence this 
monopoly power. 
4.2.1 The Demand for Differentiated Products 
The appeal of the SDS method for use in CGEMs lies in its relative simplicity. 
Its basic assumption is that the representative consumer has a preference for 
diversity. This approach is also useful because it allows the set of available 
products to vary. The utility function of the representative consumer take the 
following CES form: 
U (4.18) 
where p is a parameter of substitutability between goods and N the set of 
available products (not fixed) and is equal to the sum of domestic n and foreign 
If we assume that each firm produces only one variety of the good, the 
number of varieties is equal to the number of firms'6. 
If firms enter and exit the market, the number of varieties available to con- 
sumers varies correspondingly. The demand for each good is thus given by: 





P = (4.21) 
and p represent the price of variety i. We may interpret D as an index of total 
consumption and P as a price index. 
The main characteristic of this formulation is that, since marginal utility is 
diminishing, the representative consumer will see his welfare increase as more 
varieties enter the market. As a consequence, anything that influences the num- 
ber of varieties of the differentiated good on the market will have an impact on 
consumer's welfare. In Harris' model, the number of varieties of the domesti- 
cally manufactured good, is determined endogenously and is dependent on 
restrictive and generally unrealistic assumptions. 
'6Some authors (Harris (1984), Smith and Venables (1988)) have considered the possibility 
that a given firm may produce more than one variety (the multi-product firm). This specifi- 
cation does not materially alter the analysis very much, however, so it has not been pursued 
by many researchers. The most notable effect of assuming multi-product firm is.to lower the 
cost of adjustment following trade liberalization. 
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the number of firms while the number of varieties of the imported good, is 
adjusted so as to keep the ratio n2/n constant. One difficulty with this ap- 
proach, as Harris rightly remarks, is that, if the domestic sector is rationalized, 
foreign producers do not fill the demand for varieties discontinued by domes- 
tic producers. This reduction in the number of available varieties results in a 
welfare loss in the economy under the SDS hypothesis, which may significantly 
reduce the welfare gains expected from the elimination of tariff barriers. 
This specification may also be criticized on the basis that the elasticity of 
substitution = between products is independent of the number of va- 
rieties available. One would tend to think that, as the number of products 
increases, the elasticity of substitution between them should also increase with 
the convergence of their characteristics. Consequently, consumers will use all of 
the varieties available to them as long as the prices are finite. Finally, we should 
also pay heed to the role played by the elasticity of substitution; the greater it 
is, the less welfare increase consumers derive from an increase in the number of 
varieties of available products. 
4.2.2 Product Differentiation in the Cournot and Bertrand models 
Optimal behavior by firms in these models may be described by a generalized 
Lerner equation: 
p(X) — ! (4 22 
p(X) 
where is the firm price-elasticity of demand. For example, in the Bertrand 
model. It can be shown from equations (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21) that the price- 
elasticity of demand faced by a firm is given by: 
+ (1 — (4.23) 
Consequently, depends on which represents firm i's market share and 
which represents the degree of substitution between different varieties of the 
same good. Equation (4.7) is a special case with one imported and domestically 
produced good. Smith and Venables (1988) (and all related works), Brown and 
Stern (1989b), Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1994) and Mercenier (1994b) apply 
the Bertrand model to this issue. 
In the Bertrand model with product differentiation (cf. equation (4.23)), a 
policy of liberalizing trade decreases the firm's market share. The price-elasticity 
facing the firm consequently increases but, for low values of this effect is 
generally very small. Under these conditions, the pro-competitive effect will also 
tend to be very small. Some modelers have suggested that this pro-competitive 
effect is complemented by a change in the decision rule of the firm following 
trade policy reform. For example, in most models of product differentiation 
and oligopolistic competition, regional integration is formulated as a loss of the 
ability by firms to practice price discrimination. When markets were segmented, 
producers could establish an optimal price for each country. The creation of a 
free-trade zone obliges them to make decisions for the whole area. This is the 
approach generally used to model European integration. 
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If one prefers to suppose that firms compete on a quantity basis - the Cournot 
model - then the inverse of the price-elasticity of demand faced by a firm takes 
the following form17: 
(4.24) 
a a 
Examples of Cournot competition with product differentiation can be found in 
Harris (1984), Norman (1990), Gunasekara and Tyers (1991), Burniaux and 
Waelbroeck (1994) and Mercenier (1994a). 
As a rule, employing the Bertrand hypothesis translates into assuming more 
competitive behavior by firms. This is due to the fact that, in this model, if a 
producer lowers his price he will capture some of his competitors' clients. In the 
Cournot model, on the other hand, the quantity produced by his competitor 
is fixed. As a consequence, we should expect the pro-competitive effect to be 
stronger in the Cournot. In practice, it seems to be difficult to find big differ- 
ences in simulation's result between the two alternatives. This is at least the 
conclusion drawn by Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1992) and Mercenier (1994b) 
who experiments with those market structures. In Mercenier (1994a), results for 
the Bertrand case are not reported as trade liberalization has almost no effect. 
We should bear in mind, however, that these two models were created to repre- 
sent different realities. We may speculate, for example, that the Bertrand model 
is more appropriate for industries characterized by a relatively fiat marginal cost 
curve, as it is easier for them to adjust production in response to changes in de- 
mand. The Cournot model, conversely, would be more applicable to industries 
with steep marginal cost curves18. 
Monopolistic Competition The most commonly used model of firm-level 
product differentiation in the literature is monopolistic competition. This struc- 
ture occurs when the following three criteria are met: 
1. Each firm faces a negatively sloped demand curve. 
2. There is free entry/exit to the market (hence profits are nil in equilibrium). 
3. The price charged by one firm has negligeable effect on the demand faced 
by another firm. 
Clearly, the last hypothesis is both the most controversial and the most 
important. It is easy to conceive of differentiated products which still compete 
intensely on the market. The reason for using this formulation is not to study 
171n this case, = where P(x) is the inverse demand function derived from 
Ii 
equations (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21). Note that difficulties arise when we try to find a similar 
expression for the firm price elasticity of demand when substitution possibilities exist among 
intermediate inputs. It is necessary to resolve the models' demand system to obtain this 
elasticity. This is rarely done analytically. 
'8One opinion is that a model of competition on prices reflects producer behavior more 
accurately, but that predictions generated by the Cournot model match the empirical evidence 
better (cf. (Shapiro 1989)). 
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strategic interaction among firms, but rather to examine several other issues, 
such as the number of products supplied in an economy, or the relationship 
between product diversity and welfare. 
The assumptions of this model also yield a particularly simple form for the 
elasticity In fact, assuming that each firm is small relative to the market'9, 
the price elasticity of demand facing the firm is simply the elasticity of substi- 
tution between the products, 
= (4.25) 
This could be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with product differentiation 
where each firm become "small" relative to the market, that is, the market 
share of each firm tends to zero —p 0 in equation (4.23) and (4.24)). Since 
the price-elasticity of demand is equal to the elasticity of substitution between 
the different varieties of the product, trade policy will not affect the domestic 
producer's monopoly power unless it alters this elasticity too. Thus there is no 
pro-competitive effect in such a model. 
In light of this, some model builders have suggested that consumers' per- 
ceptions of products change with trade policy. In their models of regional 
integration, François, MacDonald, and Nordstrom (1995) assume that trade 
liberalization has the effect of rendering domestic and foreign products more 
substitutable. Subsequent to the creation of a free-trade zone, for example, con- 
sumers will tend to consider the products of all member nations equally, while. 
continuing to treat goods from other parts of the world as imperfect substitutes. 
We conclude that their is no 'best' model of oligopolistic behavior. As far 
as the structure of the market is concerned, the model builder must choose for- 
mulations which in his opinion best reflect the functioning of the economy he 
is modelling. It is important to realize that these models are not in compe- 
tition. The wealth of behavioral assumptions available to choose from should 
not be seen as a problem, the different models may describe different sectors or 
industries, depending on conditions. In any case, the behavior of firms is likely 
to be much more complex than our descriptions of them can be. Nonetheless, 
these models may, given the right circumstances, provide good approximations 
to reality. Several recent models incorporate varying market structures, where 
each sector is modelled according to the researcher's conception of how it works 
(Nguyen and Wigle (1992)). 
4.3 Increasing Returns to Scale 
One common explanation for the existence of imperfectly competitive markets 
is the existence of increasing returns to scale. In this case, bigger firms have 
an advantage over smaller ones through lower costs so that the market tends 
'9Referring to equations (4.20) and (4.21), this suggests that each firm considers its impact 
on P and D to be negligible. 
MARKET STRUCTURE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 27 
to be dominated by a small number of large firms20. Modelling increasing 
returns to scale can have important impacts on the results of policy simulations, 
particularly on predictions about welfare and efficiency effects. 
Let us formally define returns to scale: let y = f(x), where y represents a 
firm's production and x a vector of inputs. Suppose further that f(kx) = k'y. 
We say that returns to scale are increasing, constant, or decreasing if k' is greater 
than, equal to, or less than k, for k  1. Thus, with increasing returns to scale, 
average cost is less at k'y than at y21. 
Incorporating increasing returns to scale into standard CGEMs is a fairly 
standard procedure. First, we must model the imperfectly competitive behavior 
of firms in the affected sector using one or the other of the market structure hy- 
potheses presented in section 4. As for the actual modelling of scale economies, 
two options can be pursued. The first one involves adding a fixed cost to the 
usual cost function. Consequently, when the firm increases its scale of produc- 
tion, the fixed cost is spread over a larger number of units and hence average 
cost decreases toward marginal cost, which is constant. In this case, returns to 
scale tend to be exhausted as firms become large. 
To give an example, Harris (1984) postulates a fixed cost given by: 
F1(r, w) = rfk + wf (4.26) 
where rfk and wfL respectively represent the minimal cost of capital and labor 
required to start a company; w and r are respecticely the remuneration of labor 
and capital. Total costs are the sum of fixed costs plus a constant marginal 
cost (V I), which is equal to the average variable cost, multiplied by the quantity 
produced: 
= +v2(P)ys (4.27) 
where P is the vector price of intermediate good prices. 
The second option consists in modelling the cost function as log-linear. In 
this way, it is possible to choose the parameters of the function such that 
marginal costs and average costs become smaller as the firm increases its produc- 
tion22. For example, in his model, Cockburn (1994) uses a Cobb-Douglas func- 
tion where the sum of the share parameters are greater than one. Given doubts 
about whether marginal costs are constant or decreasing, Smith and Venables 
(1988) create a weighted combination of the two functional forms to model 
economies of scale. 
A measure of scale economies for which estimates are often avalaible is the 
scale elasticity. More specifically, if y = 1(x), where x is a vector of inputs, the 
20Note that perfect competition is possible when economies of scale are external. Cf. Varian 
(1992). 
21Note, however, that the inverse is not necessarily true because of the possibility of sub- 
stitution among inputs (cf. Panzar (1989)). 
22Bearing in mind that there exists a floor below which marginal costs cannot go; they can 
never be negative. 
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scale elasticity is defined as: 
n 
(4.28) 
where n represents the number of factors. Observing 6, we can say that returns 
to scale are increasing, constant or decreasing as 6 is greater, equal or smaller 
than one. Under certain regularity conditions, there is a relationship between 
the scale elasticity and another measure of scale economies called the elasticity 
of total cost. It can be shown that if C represents total costs for the firm, then: 
(4.29) 
where MC represents marginal cost and AC average cost23. 
From this relationship, it is possible to calibrate the value of fixed costs: 
F = MC(9 — l)y (4.32) 
Consequently it is possible to calibrate fixed costs from an estimation of scale 
elasticity or vice-versa. 
Finally, another frequently used measure of scale economies is the cost dis- 
advantage ratio CDR, which is simply equal to: 
CDR 1 — (4.33) 
which is greater than zero if returns to scale are increasing. 
Note that the variation in the production of affected sectors, whether it be 
an expansion or a contraction, will be amplified if the sector is characterized 
by declining marginal cost. Also, the existence of scale economies will increase 
(reduce) welfare if the affected sector expands (contracts). 
5 A Case Study 
This section illustrates modelling techniques according to the market structure 
hypotheses presented in section 4 and illustrates the ambiguity of the impacts of 
trade liberalization depending on behavioral hypotheses and critical parameters. 
23Proof for the case of two inputs: as C = +w2x2, we have that dC = w1dx1 +w2dx2, 
which we may rewrite as dC = wixi(dxi/xi) + vJ2x2(dx21x2), but, by definition all inputs 
change in the same proportion: (dxi/xi) = (dx2/x2) (dx/x). Therefore: 
dx dx dC dx 
dC = (—)(wixi + W2X2) = (—)C — = — (4.30) 
x x C x 
or, multiplying by (i-): 
a = 
(4.31) dyC dyx 
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Our base model is PARADI's model 3 (MOD3) (Decaluwé, Martin, and Souissi 
1995), a standard CGEM with constant returns to scale and perfect competition. 
This is a teaching model of an open economy with three sectors (industrial, 
agriculture and administrative services). The use of a simple model allows us to 
focus on fundamental aspects of trade liberalization in the context of imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale. 
We shall review the principal characteristics of the MOD3 in a first section. 
In the following section we will see the changes needed in order to model a 
monopoly. The modelling of a monopoly will be useful to underline the main 
effects of trade liberalization in a non-competitive context. We will then explore 
the model of Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products. In this latter 
model, we will explore one way of assessing the impact of trade policies on a 
possible rationalization of the industry. In each case, we have simulated the 
effect of the elimination of all trade barriers. The complete set of equations of 
these models are presented in appendix A. 
5.1 The Model 
5.1.1 Perfect competition 
Since this is a conventional model, we shall place more emphasis on incorpo- 
rating imperfect competition. The fictitious social accounting matrix which we 
shall use is in the appendix. The non-competitive sector shall be "industry". 
A representative consumer maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Prod- 
ucts are differentiated by origin (local vs imports) and by destination (local vs 
exports), with aggregate CES functions. Further, we assume that domestic in- 
dustrial goods are homogeneous at the level of the firm and sold on the local 
market and export market. 
The total production of each branch is Production functions are Leontief 
for intermediate consumptions and value added VAX: 
IC, = (5.1) 
= (5.2) 
where and are the shares of intermediate demand and value added respec- 
tively, IC3 is total intermediate demand for good i. Value added is described 
by the Cobb-Douglas formulation for labor and capital K: 
VA2 = (5.3) 
where A2and are respectively a scale parameter (not to be confused with 
the scale elasticity) and a share parameter. Consequently, we can write the 
production function as: 
(5.4) 
vi 
Labor and capital are assumed mobile across different sectors of the economy. 
Total labor supply is assumed fixed, with wages adjusting to maintain full em- 
ployment. Labor and capital demands, derived from the profit maximization 
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VA Q where = , P2 is the consumer price of the composite 
good i, ICJ2, = and is the share of intermediate consumption of 
good j used in the production of composite good 1. 
In terms of model resolution, factor demands can be substituted into equa- 
tion 5.4 to obtain the supply function for the sector. Equilibrium price and 
quantity are determined by supply and demand conditions. As we pointed out, 
although the profit maximization condition is not introduced explicitly, it can 
be inferred from the fact that the value of the marginal product of each factor 
is equal to its remuneration, as in equation 4.2. Results of trade liberalization 
under Perfect Competition (PC) are reported in section 5.1.4. 
5.1.2 Monopoly 
To adapt the model to incorporate a monopolistic sector, we must alter certain 
equations pertaining to this sector. The rest of the model remain unchanged. 
We must first render the profit maximization condition explicit. The monopolist 
maximizes profits in the domestic market according to equation (4.6)24: 
pD(x)_MC(x) __i_ (57 PD(X) ED 
where pD, MC, eD are respectively the domestic price, marginal cost and 
domestic price-elasticity faced by the producer. 
Conditional factor demands for labor and capital are the solution to the 
minimization of total cost under the technological constraints in equation ( 5.1) 
and (5.2): 
= 
. (5.8) (l—a2)wj A1 
K: 




Note that equations (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9), do not all appear in the model 
presented in the appendix. In the solution to the model, the level of production 
and the price are determined by demand for the industrial product and the profit 
24We use the contestable market hypothesis to model export markets. Hence, firms price 
the export good at average cost: 
pE = AC 
where pE is the export price of the monopolist AC average cost. 
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maximization condition respectively. Given this production level and one of the 
conditional factor demand functions, the production function (5.1) implicitly 
determines the demand for the other factor. Consequently, one of the equations 
(5.8) and (5.9) becomes redundant and may be discarded. We have eliminated 
the demand function for capital in our model. 
We now require an expression for marginal cost (MC) and for the price- 
elasticity of demand, facing the firm in equation 5.7. We derive the function 
for marginal cost by substituting the conditional demand for labor and capital 
and the demand for intermediate goods into the equation of total costs (TC), 
which is then differentiated with respect to the output of the branch, Total 
costs are given by: 
TC2 = + + (5.10) 
where is the consumer price for the composite good j. 
Substituting equations (5.1), (5.8) and (5.9) into the total cost equation 
(5.10), differentiating this equation with respect to production and simpli- 





Given the Armington hypothesis of imperfect substituability between imported 
and domestic goods, the price-elasticity of demand in the branch and, by ex- 
tension, facing the monopolist, takes the form given in equation (4.7): 
= 
+ (1 — (5.12) 
where and represent the price and quantity of the CES composite good 
Q2 and of the domestic good D2 respectively; and a2 represents the elasticity 
of substitution between the domestic and imported good. It is inherent in the 
structure of this model that a rise in the price of imported products will cause an 
increase in the price-elasticity of demand facing the monopolist. Consequently, 
we can see how the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization come into play. 
The monopolist's profits are determined residually as the difference between 
the value of production and the cost of factors: 
PR1 = PIXf — P39 1CJ13 — wL1 — rK1 (5.13) 
These profits are directly allocated to households in our model. 
To incorporate returns to scale we add a fixed cost for capital, yielding: 
(5.14) 
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In this way we may partition the monopolist's capital usage into a variable com- 
ponent and a fixed component We then must determine the share of 
fixed costs in total costs or, equivalently, the magnitude of attainable economies 
of scale. This step is often complicated by the absence of estimates of fixed 
costs. It is easier, however, to estimate the economies of scale available for a 
given level of production, and derive the fixed costs after the fact. We thus have 





where AC, represents average cost. One can determine the associated level of 
fixed cost from equation (4.32). Consistently, the link between average and 
marginal costs is also: 
AC2 = MC2 + 
R *KF, 
(5.16) 
This is the approach followed by most authors. This parameter may originate 
in econometric analysis of firms' cost structures, or it may be derived from 
engineering studies. 
Calibration The calibration of the model is fairly standard, hence we will 
limit ourselves only to elements specific to the introduction of the monopoly. 
First, we have to evaluate the level of super-profits in the industrial sector. We 
have choosen a value of 550, as specified in the social accounting matrix. For 
our fictional case, this is a purely arbitrarily value. In practice, estimations of 
super-profits must be made carefully since they are hard to pin down and can 
substantially affect the results of the model. For example, it is possible that part 
of the monopoly profits take the form of higher remuneration for some factors 
of production. A monopolist may produce at a higher cost than a competitive 
firm. Some of these profits may also be invested in lobbying to retain monopoly 
power. 
We have made a simulation with Constant Returns to Scale (MCRS) and 
another one with Increasing Returns to Scale (MIRS). In the latter simulation we 
fixed the elasticity (PS) of scale at 1.1 and calibrated the fixed costs compatible 
with this parameter. 
Given the rate of profits and scale economies given previously, we have cali- 
brated the perceived price-elasticity of demand residually so as to be consistent 
with the observed mark-up. Other possibilities include residually calibrating 
the marginal cost, the rate of profits or the number of firms. We will explore 
some of those possibilities later in the Cournot model. 
Finally, the numeraire is the world price of imports. Under perfect com- 
petition, the choice of the numeraire has no impact on the simulation results. 
However, several authors have demonstrated that this is not true when condi- 
tions of imperfect competition prevail. The problem arises because the goal of 
the firm is to maximize profits in terms of a basket of goods specified by a pro- 
cess of normalization. When the firm recognizes that it has influence over prices, 
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the maximization goal will depend upon the numeraire. One way of resolving 
this is to specify that the objective of the firm is to maximize the utility of its 
owners rather than profits. For this to work we require detailed information 
about the structure of corporate ownership in the economy. 
There are reasons to believe, however, that the choice of numeraire has little 
real impact. First, the choice of numeraire only has a significant impact when 
the imperfectly competitive sectors constitute a large share of the economy. In 
most countries, this is not the case. Second, it can be shown that if we select 
the numeraire from among the competitively traded goods, choices made by 
producers in the non-competitive sectors are not affected. For these two reasons 
this particular issue has not posed a serious concern to most model builders25. 
The reader interested in pursuing this is invited to consult Ginsburgh (1994) 
among others. 
5.1.3 Cournot Model with Homogeneous Products 
As the Cournot model can be interpreted as an intermediate case between 
monopoly and perfect competition, one could expect that the effect of trade 
liberalization will be also intermediate between these two extremes. The main 
difference regarding the modelling of oligopoly is the explicit introduction of a 
limited (but greater than one) number of firms. Thus, it will be useful in the 
model to define per-firm output exports (XE!) and domestic demand 
(XDI): 





where is the number of identical firms in sector i. 
The profit maximizing decision takes the following form: 
25 the issue of choice of numeraire, the introduction of imperfect competition and 
returns to scale in CGEMs raises questions concerning the uniqueness of equilibrium and the 
level of aggregation. The addition of economies of scale introduces non-convexities into the 
model. Consequently, one of the necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibrium in models with constant returns to scale does not obtain here. 
Nonetheless, research to date has not yielded a measure of the magnitude of the problem, 
and the existence of multiple equilibria seems to be the exception. See Mercenier (1995) for 
a dissenting view. 
The degree of aggregation of the model assumes particular importance in the case of CGEMs 
with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. The bias introduced by the aggre- 
gation of cost functions in sectors with economies of scale causes us to under-estimate savings 
related to the scale of production, (cf. Harris (1984)). Consequently, we should expect that a 
more aggregated model will produce lower estimates of welfare gains. 
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PD(X)MC(X) — 1 
521 PD(X) 
where ef' is the same as in equation (5.12). 
Finally, to incorporate increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm, 
one must modify equations (5.14) and (5.16) in the following way: 
= (5.22) 
AC, = (5.23) 
Calibration We have used the same value for industry super-profits and firm 
returns to scale as the case with monopoly. However, we have tried different 
ways of calibrating the oligopoly mark-up. We first calibrated residually the 
number of firms. One should take caution before interpreting this number as 
the true number of firms in the economy. In fact, it should be interpreted as the 
Cournot-equivalent number of firm. The second method of calibration, given 
the knowledge of the number of firms in the industry, involve the introduction 
of a parameter, determined endogenously to reconcile data about super-profits, 
returns to scale and price-elasticity of demand. 
Call this parameter 7 and set it so that: 
pD (X) — MC (X) — (1+ 
5 24 pD(x) N2E (. 
Notice that this is the mark-up derived in the oligopolist model with conjectural 
variations. But given the conceptual difficulties associated with conjectural 
variations, one could interpret (as Saloner (1994)) as an indication of the 
level of competition in the industry. For example, if is greater than zero, this 
simply means that the firms are able to fix a mark-up higher than in the pure 
Cournot model. 
Simulations We simulated a removal of all tariffs under six different scenarios. 
The first scenario is the one with Perfect Competition (PC), the second and 
third one are those of Cournot oligopoly with Constant (OCRS) and Increasing 
(OIRS) Returns to Scale. 
In a fourth case, we experimented with the so-called Contestable Market 
case (0CM) (cf. Baumol and Lee (1991)). In this latter case, we suppose that 
there is no cost to entry or exit so that firms fix their domestic price equal to 
average cost to discourage entry: 
= (5.25) 
Although purely hypothetical, simulations results under this scenario are useful 
since they let us distinguish between results due to market conduct and market 
structure. 
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We drop the hypothesis of no Entry and Exit in the fifth scenario (OEE). 
In this scenario, firms are assumed to enter or exit the market in response to 
changes in profitability. This scenario should be interpreted as representing 
the long run. This characterization of long-term equilibrium raises a question 
about the assumption of free entry/exit of firms. Mercenier and Schmidt (1995) 
argue that if this occurs without costs, then the estimates of welfare gains from 
trade liberalization will be biased upwards. We may, however, assume that a 
significant share of the fixed costs paid by the firm cannot be recuperated. The 
existence of these sunk costs will create a barrier to exit, a firm will stay in the 
market as long as its revenues cover variable costs. These costs also constitute 
a barrier to entry since they impose a burden on would-be entrants. 
A conceptual problem with making a distinction between the short and long 
run lies in determining the rate of profits at the equilibrium. How should profits 
come down to zero in the long term in the case of a non-competitive market 
structure. Should we not suppose that the firm retain some market power. In 
fact, it his hard to believe that trade liberalization will wipe out all super-profits 
from the economy. In this context, the effect of trade liberalization and those 
resulting from an assumption of zero profits in the long run are conceptually 
different. A way around those difficulties lies in comparing the results of that 
simulation, not with our base case, but with one where we allow firm entry and 
exit but keep the structure of protection constant. That is the reference point 
in the results presented here. 
5.1.4 Results 
The results of the three scenarios are summarized, for selected variables, in table 
2. We will limit ourselves to drawing attention to the following points: 
1. Under the hypothesis of perfect competition (CP), we obtain the tradi- 
tional results. 
2. The unprotected sector (agriculture) expands and the protected sector 
(industry) contract following a reduction in taxes on imports. 
3. This contraction is reflected both in a decline in output as well as in a fall 
in relative prices. 
4. As labor is used more intensively in agriculture, the wage rate increases 
relative to the return to capital. 
5. The net effect of liberalization is an increase in household income in nom- 
inal terms and, even more, in real terms. 
These results undergo qualitative changes when we introduce the monopoly 
sector and imperfect competition: 
1. The fall in price-elasticity of demand for the monopolist's output forces 
him to reduce his mark-up (and price) and increase his production relatives 
to the competitive case. 
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Table 2: Simulation Results : Elimination of import taxes 
2. Profits (super-profits) decrease. 
3. Welfare gains increase slightly when imperfect competition is introduced, 
even more when we include increasing returns to scale26 
4. Wage and return to capital (net of profits) increase in real terms. 
Clearly, these effects depend on the assumptions underlying the model, but 
they reveal the importance of accounting for imperfect competition when it is 
suspected of playing an important role in the economy. Like we said before, 
oligopoly being a intermediate case between monopoly and perfect competition, 
the results reported here are also intermediate. In particular, note that welfare 
decreases relative to the perfect competition case when we take into account 
imperfect competition but increases when we add scale economies. As in the 
monopoly case, the pro-competitive effect is also present but to a lesser extent as 
the industrial sector expands27. Finally, although some firm exit in simulation 
26Welfare changes are measured by equivalent variations. Foreign savings are constant so 
the national economy cannot get a "free lunch". Government expenditures are also constant 
to keep focus on the representative agent. Accordingly, there is lump-sum tax on household to 
compensate the government for any loss of revenue incurred because of the trade liberalization. 
Finally, the volume of investment is fixed to abstract form intertemporal issues. 
270ne should note that the allocation of resources is sensitive to the elasticity of substitution 
between imports and domestic production as reported by Devarajan and Rodrik (1991). We 
have used a value for this elasticity of 1.0. Sensitivity tests (not reported here) show that the 
pro-competitive effect grows weaker as this elasticity increases. 
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OEE, the effect is not very strong. Hence, one should not expect rationalization 
to follow automatically from trade liberalization in those simulations. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper does not pretend to present a comprehensive analysis of the issues in- 
volved in integrating economies of scale and imperfect competition into CGEMs; 
we have rather attempted to emphasize some of the main features of this ex- 
ercise. Given the conditions in developing countries, we argued that imperfect 
competition and economies of scale are probably the norm, not the exception. 
Next we reviewed studies in which CGEMs have been applied to situations of 
imperfect competition and economies of scale. Then we summarized the avail- 
able methods of incorporating monopoly power into these models. Implications 
of imperfectly competitive markets for trade policy were considered, and we 
ascertained that only empirical analysis can establish the size and direction in 
which key variables will move. Finally, using a simple model of monopoly, we 
provided an example of the usefulness of computable general equilibrium models 
for the analysis of the effects of trade policy on the monopoly power of domestic 
firms. 
The results of our simple model of an hypothetical economy confirm those 
of the literature, namely that (1) taking into account imperfect competition 
can affect the resource allocation pattern; (2) the impact on welfare remains 
uncertain, although incorporating economies of scale will almost surely increase 
it. Given the poor evidence for scale economies in developing countries, this 
should be considered with care; (3) even if rationalization of the industry has 
been shown to have a big impact in some CGEMs, we show like Devarajan and 
Rodrik that it does not automatically follow from trade liberalization. In fact, 
given the strong barriers to entry/exit in developing countries, it is doubtful 
whether trade liberalization will in itself be sufficient for such a rationalization. 
However, the case for trade liberalization remain strong. The framework 
with which we experimented does not capture many features like increased 
product diversity or dynamic gains like increased productivity. Even in a static 
framework, some work should be done on the hypothesis of the representative 
firm. In reality, big and small, more or less efficient firms coexist (cf. Lee 
(1992)). One could think of a model where trade liberalization increase the 
market share of the more efficient firms (cf. Westbrook and Tybout (1993)). 
Taking account imperfect competition and scale economies has deepened our 
understanding of trade liberalization but there is still a long way ahead! 
have used a value for this elasticity of 1.0. Sensitivity tests (not reported here) show that the 
pro-competitive effect grows weaker as this elasticity increases. 
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7 Appendix A 
7.1 Sets 
i,j All sectors 
(AGR,IND,SAD) 
m Commercial sectors 
(AGR,IND) 
nm Non-commercial sectors 
(SAD) 
cp Competitive sectors 
(AGR) 
ncp Non-competitive sectors 
(IND) 
7.2 Model 
7.2.1 Production and factor demand 
Perfect Competition 
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Contestables markets The monopoly mark-up is replaced by the following 
eqution: 
= (7.38) 
7.2.2 Income and Saving 
yM = (7.39) 
(1 — ty)YM (7.40) 
UTI (7.41) 
r 





SM = pins . (7.47) 
Sc = yG — E13?CTG (7.48) 
7.2.3 Demand 
CTM = yM - SM (749) 
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= 13?CTM (7.50) 
= 13?CTG (7.51) 
C1 (7.52) 
D11 = (7.53) 
j 
(7.54) 
IT = INVm (7.55) 
m 
7.2.4 Prices 
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7.2.5 Foreign Trade 
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7.2.6 Equilibrium 
LS = (7.72) 
KS >2Km (7.73) 
= + D12 + (7.74) 
— XDd (7 75) 
VIT = SM + SG + eBOC (7.76) 
7.3 Endogeneous Variables 
Branch i's production 
VAm Branch m's value added 
Branch i's labor demand 
YM : Total household income 
SM : Household savings 
YDM : Household disposable income 
YG Government revenue 
SG Government savings 
Indirect taxes 
: Revenue from import duties 
TXF : Revenue from export tariffs 
BOG Current account balance (in foreign currency) 
GM Total household consumption (val) 
Consumption of good i (vol) 
Cl1 : Total intermediate consumption by branch 
Intermediate consumption of good i by branch j 
ID2 : Intermediate demand of good i 
IT : Total investment (val) 
INVZ Consumption of good i for investment uses (vol) 
: Local supply of the domestically produced good 
: Local demand of the domestically produced good 
: Exports supply (FOB volume) 
: Exports demand (FOB volume) 
Imports (CAF volume) 
Supply of the composite good 
: Local supply of the domestically produced good per firm 
Xf Exports supply per firm (FOB volume) 
Branch i's production per firm 
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w : Wage rate 
r : Rate of return of capital 
IGP : General price index 
pVA 
: Value added price 
: Producer price 
pD 
: Price of domestically produced and consumed goods 
p29 : Price of composite goods 
pM 
: Domestic price of imports 
pE 
: Domestic price of export 
Km : Branch n's capital stock 
PSncomp : Scale parameter 
ACncomp : Average cost 
MCncomp : Marginal cost 
PRncomp : Profits 
Price elasticity of domestic demand 
Nncomp : Number of firms 
7.4 Exogeneous Variables 
KS : Total capital supply 
KF : Fixed capital 
Total labor supply 
pWM World price of imports (in foreign currency) (numéraire) 
pWE 
: World price of exports (in foreign currency) 
CG : Public consumption (value) 
TEG : Foreign transfer payments to the government 
TEM : Foreign transfer payments to the households 
e : Nominal exchange rate 
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7.5 Parameters 
Technical coefficients in intermediate consumption 
io, : Technical coefficients in production 
Vm Idem 
Idem 
: Scale factor in value added function 
am Labor elasticity in value added function 
: CET scale parameter 
CET distributive share 
CET elasticity of transformation 
Elas city of transformation 
: CES scale parameter 
CES distributive share 
CET elasticity of transformation 
Export price elasticity 
Elasticity of substitution 
pins : Household marginal propensity to save 
ty : Household income tax rate 
Indirect tax rate 
tinm Import duty rate 
Export tax rate 
Share of good i in household consumption 
Share of good i in public consumption 
Share of good i in total investment 
Branch i's share in total production 

Q The principal objective of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), established in August 1988, is to AERC strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, rigorous inquiry into problems pertinent to the management of economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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